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DISCUSSION KICK-OFF
Which Rights to enforce in 
Time of Public 
Emergency?
The European Court of Human Right’s approach 
towards International Humanitarian Law
The present post examines the relationship between human 
rights law (“HRL”) and international humanitarian law (“IHL”). 
This relationship will be first analysed from a legal-dogmatic 
angle, and then in the light of the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (“the Court”)”. By focussing solely on 
the right to derogate from the European Convention on 
Human Rights pursuant to Article 15, this post will show that 
the Court’s approach towards the clarification of the said 

relationship differs from the practice of other international 
courts.
The relationship between international humanitarian law 
and human rights law
Situations of armed conflicts and occupation are governed by 
two bodies of international law: IHL and HRL. In scholarship 
and legal practice the relationship between IHL and HRL has 
been addressed under four main approaches: The ‘separatist’, 
‘complementarist’ and ‘integrationist’ approach as well as the 
lex specialis position of the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”). The ‘separatists’ approach defends the view that both 
branches should be treated separately (see inter alia, M. H. 
Meyrowitz, Mushkat or KD Suter). ‘Complementarists’ argue 
that both branches of law are not identical but complement 
each other (see inter alia E. David or Schindler). 
‘Integrationists’, by contrast, support the merger between 
both branches since they picture IHL and HRL as belonging 
to a common branch (see inter alia MacBride, GIAD Draper 
or W. Kälin). The ICJ, for its part, has stated in its Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion that IHL is lex specialis to HRL in 
armed conflicts. The prevailing opinion amongst scholars 
tends to be the ‘complementarist’ approach whereas the 
practice of international courts and human rights bodies 
shows that they favour the approach developed by of the ICJ.
The European Court of Human Rights, by comparison, has 
avoided clarifying the relationship between IHL and HRL. In 
the Court’s case-law, situations giving rise to a potential 
interplay of these two branches of international law have 
been addressed under Article 15 of the Convention, 
enshrining the right to derogate from the Convention. It 
appears therefore of interest to have a brief overview of the 
Court’s case-law on this matter.
The right to derogate from the European Convention on 
Human Rights pursuant to Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights
The derogation clause allows state parties to the Convention 
to temporarily derogate from their obligation to secure 
certain rights and freedoms under the Convention. Art. 15 § 1 
states that certain derogations may be made in time of war 
or other public emergency provided that ‘such measures are 
not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law’.
It follows that the activation of this derogation clause 
requires the existence of a situation that amounts to ‘war or 
other public emergency’. In Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3, 1 July 
1961, §28), the Court qualified the time of public emergency 
as ‘an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency, which 
affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the 
organised life of the community of which the State is 
composed.’ In the ‘Greek’ case (Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and the Netherlands v. Greece, 5 November 1969, nos. 
3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, §113), the 
Commission held that, in order to justify such derogation, the 
emergency should be actual or imminent. Recently, the 
definition of a public emergency was even expanded in A. and 
Others v. the United Kingdom (19 February 2009, no. 3455/05 
§216) to the effect that the menace posed by international 
terrorism has been considered as a threat to the life of the 
nation.
Article 15 and the principle of consistency with ‘other 
obligations under international law’
The validity of a derogation measure, however, depends on 
its consistency with ‘other obligations under international 
law’. The requirement of consistency stated in Article 15 § 1 
serves as another safeguard besides the procedural and 
substantial ones and refers to other branches of international 
law.
To date, the Court has not found that any derogation 
measure has ever breached Article 15 § 1 on the basis that it 
violated rules of IHL. For instance, in Lawless v. Ireland (§41) 
the Court only made brief reference to IHL, holding that 
there were no facts that proved that the Irish derogation 
from Article 5 of the Convention conflicted with any of its 
obligations under international law.
With respect to military operations in situations of conflict, 
the Court delivered important judgments towards Turkey 
regarding Kurdish civilians and Russia regarding Chechens. 
The most relevant cases in this context concerned civil losses 
(for instance Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, no. 
66/1997/850/1057 and Isayeva v. Russia, 24 February 2005, 
no. 57950/00), thus allowing the Court to apply the rules of 
IHL. However, Turkey and Russia have never declared the 
state of emergency in relation to these situations of conflict. 
So, the Court has never had the opportunity to find that 
these two States have breached Article 15 § 1. Rather, the 
Court only examined these cases from the perspective of the 
number of grounds for interference and the principle of 
proportionality, without considering any potential violation 
of the law of IHL.
Recently, groundbreaking changes in the case law of the 
Court could be observed with respect to the derogation 
clause used in the context of international armed conflicts. 
While in the past the Court had avoided to answer the 
question of whether it considered Article 15 applicable to 
international armed conflicts (Banković and Others v. Belgium 
and 16 Other Contracting States, no. 52207/99, § 62), in its 
very recent judgment Hassan v. the United Kingdom (16 
September 2014, no. 29750/09, §104), it has clarified this 
important legal question.
In that case the Court examined the lawfulness of a 
deprivation of liberty of a young male by British forces during 
hostilities in Iraq in the context of the British military 
operations undergoing in that country. Despite the absence 
of a formal derogation, the Court took account of the context 
and the rules of IHL when interpreting and applying Article 5 
of the Convention. It further ruled that, even in situations of 
international armed conflict, the safeguards under the 
Convention continued to apply, albeit interpreted against the 
background of the provisions of IHL. The Court said that, by 
reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by IHL 
and by the European Convention in time of armed conflict, 
the requirements determining the lawfulness of deprivation 
of liberty set out under Article 5 should be fulfilled as far as 
possible and applied conjontly. To put it in other words, the 
Court decided that detention had to comply with the rules of 
IHL and most importantly, that it should be in accordance 
with the fundamental purpose of Article 5 § 1, namely to 
protect the individual from arbitrariness.
The Hassan judgment can be considered as revolutionary 
because, for the first time, the Court has not only considered 
IHL as applying together with the Convention law, but, in this 
specific case, it has also given it precedence over the latter. It 
remains to be seen if in the Court will jump on the 
bandwagon and prioritise this question also in the context of 
non-international armed conflicts. The Court might finally 
have the opportunity to rule on Article 15 § 1 of the 
Convention from this angle in connection with the “state of 
emergency” recently declared by France and Ukraine.
A reply to this post can be found here.
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